The blunt-edged, security-oriented approach allows little space to tackle the root causes of violence and find resolution
- Sophie Haspeslagh is an assistant professor in political science at the American University in Cairo
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the United States spearheaded an international campaign to contain the threat from militant groups, like al-Qaida, by encouraging states to blacklist “terrorist” groups. Perhaps the most significant part of this effort was the passing of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (UNSC 1373), on 28 September 2001. Twenty years later, the return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan is just one example of how this heavy-handed anti-terror strategy failed.
The global blacklisting regime has not only failed to contain the Taliban but it has also made it harder to end wars across the globe. Resolution 1373 encouraged member states to set up their own blacklists to sanction the support of terror groups. But in the absence of a UN definition of what actually constitutes “terrorism”, the resolution led to states identifying suspects in light of their own national interests. Beyond al-Qaida and the Taliban, armed groups as diverse as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc), the Communist Party of Nepal, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Turkey, the Communist Party of the Philippines and Hamas in Palestine were listed as terrorists.