Any evaluation of the campaign must prioritise genuine investigation over reputation management
It was an extraordinary volte-face. On 7 August Gen Sir Nick Carter, the chief of the defence staff and professional head of Britain’s military, wrote an op-ed on Afghanistan in the Times stating that it was too soon “to write off the country”. “There are increasing signs that the population is rallying in defiance,” he added. Eleven days later, after the Taliban had taken Afghanistan’s provincial capitals, followed by Kabul, and the Afghan army – raised by the west at a cost of $83bn – had melted away, Carter appeared on television. “You have to be very careful using the word enemy,” he told Sky News. “People need to understand who the Taliban actually are … They are bound together by a common purpose which is they don’t like corrupt governance … I do think that they have changed.”
The general deserves some compassion. Like the rest of the leadership of Britain’s army, the post-9/11 wars defined his professional life. Carter commanded a brigade in Iraq in 2003-04 and later led a “regional command” in Afghanistan. His recent public pronouncements suggest an understandable desire not to undercut the sacrifices of his troops. Nonetheless, Carter’s dramatic pivot, combined – more bluntly – with the fact that he is still in post, underlines an important point. There is an urgent need within the British military now for a root and branch appraisal of why this has all happened. Yet, due to a variety of factors, both inside and outside the military, a full postmortem is unlikely.